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Abstract
We introduce an information-theoretic framework, named Coded State Machine
(CSM), to securely and efficiently execute multiple state machines on untrusted network
nodes, some of which are Byzantine. The standard method of solving this problem is
using State Machine Replication, which achieves high security at the cost of low effi-
ciency. We propose CSM, which achieves the optimal linear scaling in storage efficiency,
throughput, and security simultaneously with the size of the network. The storage ef-
ficiency is scaled via the design of Lagrange coded states and coded input commands
that require the same storage size as their origins. The computational efficiency is
scaled using a novel delegation algorithm, called INTERMIX, which is an information-
theoretically verifiable matrix-vector multiplication algorithm of independent interest.
Using INTERMIX, the network nodes securely delegate their coding operations to a
single worker node, and a small group of randomly selected auditor nodes verify its
correctness, so that computational efficiency can scale almost linearly with the network
size, without compromising on security.
1 Introduction
A state machine is a program that executes a state transition function (S(t + 1), Y (t)) =
f(S(t),X(t)). In each round t, given an input command X(t) and the current state S(t), the
machine uses f to compute an output command Y (t), and transitions its state to S(t + 1). In
this paper, we consider the problem of securely implementing K independent and identical state
machines over a network of N ≥ K untrusted compute nodes, some of which are subject to Byzan-
tine faults. Such model has a wide range of applications. For instance, multiple financial institutes
manage their users’ accounts over a data center comprised of commodity hardware, or a blockchain
system maintains multiple ledgers (shards) of users’ transactions over a peer-to-peer network.
For such a system, there are three critical performance metrics: 1) security β, defined as the
maximum number of malicious nodes that can be tolerated; 2) storage efficiency γ, defined as the
total number of state machines that can be supported given that each node has a storage size of
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a single state; and 3) throughput λ, defined as the total number of commands processed per unit
time. Information theoretically, all three metrics scale at most linearly with the network size N .
However, simultaneous linear scaling of all three metrics has never been achieved in the liter-
ature. The canonical approach to deal with faulty nodes/processors is state machine replication
(SMR) (see, e.g., [2, 11, 26, 27, 43]). The most classic one is full replication, where all the K state
machines are replicated at all the N nodes. By applying the majority rule, full replication achieves
a linearly-scaling security of βfull =
N
2 , but a storage efficiency of only γfull = 1, and a throughout
of only λfull =
1
c(f) , where c(f) is the computational complexity of the state transition function f
(details in Section 3.1). An alternative approach is partial replication, where different state ma-
chines are replicated at a different disjoint subset of q = N/K nodes. Partial replication improves
the storage efficiency and throughout to γpartial = K and λpartial =
K
c(f) , respectively, which scale
linearly with N by letting K scale linearly with N . However, since each state machine is only
handled by a set of q nodes at any time regardless of the allocation strategy [25, 36], the security
drops by K times to βpartial =
q
2 once the adversary identifies this set and then corrupts it. A
key theoretical question in this context is whether this tradeoff between efficiency and security is
fundamental or can be circumvented by careful algorithm design.
Table 1: Performance comparison of proposed CSM with state machine replication and information-theoretic
limits in synchronous networks. Here 0 ≤ µ < 1
2
is some constant (µ = 1
3
is a concrete example). The state
transition function f is an arbitrary multivariate polynomial with constant degree d. c(f) and c(coding) are
the computational complexities of f and the coding operations per node in CSM respectively.
Security Storage efficiency Throughput
Full Replication N2 1
1
c(f)
Partial Replication N2K K
K
c(f)
Information-Theoretic Limit N2 N
N
c(f)
Coded State Machine (CSM) µN (1− 2µ)N/d +1−1/d (1−2µ)N/d+1−1/dc(f)+c(coding)
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that there is no fundamental tradeoff
between (storage and throughout) efficiency scaling and security scaling in state machine opera-
tion. In particular, we propose “Coded State Machine” (CSM), which simultaneously achieves linear
scaling for both storage efficiency and security, for both synchronous and partially synchronous net-
works (see Table 1). CSM also achieves an almost linear scaling for throughput under synchronous
networks through the development of an interactive matrix-vector multiplication verification pro-
tocol named INTERMIX (specifically, INTERMIX helps to reduce the coding complexity per node
c(coding) in Table 1 to O(log2N log logN)).
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Figure 1: A block diagram illustration of main operations in Coded State Machine.
CSM works on a general class of state transition functions that are multivariate polynomials.
The key idea behind CSM is to have each node execute the state transaction function f on a coded
state and a coded command, so that the N coded outputs can be used to decode the K original
outputs. More specifically, CSM generates each coded state/command by evaluating a Lagrange
polynomial at some points, such that the output of f can be viewed as evaluating another poly-
nomial of higher degree at the same point. Given enough evaluations (some of them could be
erroneous) of this new polynomial, we employ efficient noisy polynomial interpolation algorithms
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(e.g., Reed-Solomon decoding) to decode the K original outputs, providing the security guarantees
of CSM. Moreover, since a coded state has the same size as an original state, CSM retains the
optimal storage efficiency. Finally, to reduce the encoding/decoding overhead for throughput scal-
ing, we utilize INTERMIX to delegate the coding operations of all nodes to a single worker node,
where fast polynomial interpolation/evaluation algorithms can be applied to minimize computa-
tional complexity. We illustrate the main operation flow of CSM in Figure 1.
Related Works. Conventional SMR research focuses on designing optimal protocols for the
consensus phase (where the nodes aim to agree on which input command submitted by the clients
should be used) that tolerate the maximum number of faulty processors [10,11,17,27,28,37]. CSM
uses the same consensus protocols to decide on the input commands.
Concepts from coding theory have been utilized earlier to provide fault tolerance to state ma-
chine execution. Building upon prior work [3, 20], fused state machine is proposed in [4]. There,
given n primary finite state machines, f fusion replica machines are constructed to correct up to f2
Byzantine faults. The fusion replicas are components of the closed partition lattice [22, 29] of the
reachable product state of the primary machines, and are selected such that the minimum distance
between any two product states is at least f + 1. Compared with the proposed CSM, while the
fused state machine also achieves security scaling, the storage size at each replica increases with
the number of primary machines n, as opposed to a constant storage size of a single state in CSM.
When the state machine operations are write and read, i.e., the state machine system emulates a
fault-tolerant shared memory, erasure codes have been exploited to minimize the storage costs given
the coexistence of multiple versions of the data object, while ensuring that a reader can decode an
atomically consistent version [1, 8, 9, 13,23,47].
The coding design of CSM is inspired by recent developments in coded computing [16, 30–32,
46, 48, 49], which leverage tools from coding theory to inject computation redundancy in order
to improve latency, security, and privacy of distributed computing applications. In particular, as
similarly done in Lagrange Coded Computing [48] to create coded data batches, CSM creates and
processes coded states/commands using the Lagrange polynomial. However, in contrast to one-shot
computation on static data in [48], the requirement of dynamically updating the local coded state
that is compatible with the upcoming state transition poses new challenges in the design of CSM.
Compared to the existing verifiable matrix-vector multiplication schemes [18, 19, 42, 50, 51],
INTERMIX has two advantages. First, it is information-theoretically secure, i.e., it is secure even
if the nodes have unlimited computation power. Second, INTERMIX enables almost every node in
the network (with the exception of a constant number of auditors) to verify the correctness of the
results in constant time. By contrast, in the existing schemes the verification complexity is at least
linear in the size of the output. INTERMIX has the shortcoming that it is an interactive algorithm.
However, the small number of required interactions (logarithmic in the number of nodes) allows us
to trade a low communication overhead in exchange for the aforementioned desirable properties.
2 System Description and Problem Formulation
We define a deterministic state machine (SM) as a collection of an input alphabet X , an output
alphabet Y, a state space S, and a deterministic state transition function f : S × X → S × Y,
for some vector spaces X , Y, and S over some field F. The state of the state machine evolves in
discrete rounds. At round t, given the current state S(t) and the input command X(t), the state
machine computes a state transition function (S(t+1), Y (t)) = f(S(t),X(t)) to generate an output
response Y (t), and transitions into the next state S(t+ 1).
We consider operating K independent state machines with the same state transition function
on N ≥ K unreliable compute nodes (e.g., hosting K database services on N commodity machines
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in a datacenter). There are a total of M clients, who submit their queries/commands to the K
state machines for processing. In particular, at time t, each SM k has state Sk(t), and selects an
input command Xk(t) from the pool of commands submitted to SM k. Then, SM k executes Xk(t)
by computing (Sk(t+1), Yk(t)) = f(Sk(t),Xk(t)), returns the output result Yk(t) to the client who
submits Xk(t), and transitions into next state Sk(t+ 1).
Figure 2: Illustration of operating K=2 state machines over N=3 nodes, one of which (node 2) is malicious.
Malicious nodes can compromise the system security in the consensus phase, in the execution phase when
honest nodes try to decode the computation results, and when delivering the decoded outputs to the clients.
2.1 Network and Failure Models
We consider a fully connected network between the clients and the compute nodes; Figure 2(a)
shows a subset Mk ⊆ {1, . . . ,M} of clients continuously and concurrently submit their commands
to be processed at SM k by broadcasting them to all compute nodes. For the communication
between the nodes, we study two settings:
Synchronous network, with a fixed and known upper bound on the communication latency between
any pair of nodes.
Partially synchronous network, with unbounded communication delay until an unknown global
stabilization time (GST), after which the network becomes synchronous. Here a node expecting a
message cannot distinguish between a failed message sender and a slow network since it does not
know if GST has been reached.
To implement the state machine operations over the N nodes, at round t, each node i locally
stores some (possibly coded) data Zi(t) ∈ W, for some vector space W over F, which is gener-
ated by some function φti over the states S1(t), . . . , SK(t). With these locally stored data, the
implementation proceeds in two phases: the consensus phase, and the execution phase.
Consensus Phase. For each round index t, all network nodes run some consensus protocol, via
exchanging messages (possibly over many iterations), to reach an agreement on a set of input com-
mands X1(t), . . . ,XK(t) to process (the consensus setting is standard in the literature, e.g., [15]).
For each k, we label the index of the client who submits Xk(t) as m
t
k.
Execution Phase. As shown in Figure 2(b), each node i computes locally some intermediate
result gti , as some function ρ
t
i of its stored data Zi(t), and the commands X1(t), . . . ,XK(t) agreed
in the consensus phase, and multicasts gti to a subset of other nodes. Using the local computation
result, and the results received from other nodes, each node i recovers the state transition functions
for a subset Kti ⊆ {1, . . . ,K} of state machines via some function ψ
t
i , obtaining |K
t
i| estimates
ψti({g
t
i}
N
i=1) = {(Sˆik(t + 1), Yˆik(t))}k∈Kt
i
. Then, each node i returns each of its computed output
Yˆik(t) to the intended client m
t
k, and updates its local storage to Zi(t + 1) by computing some
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function χti on the current storage Zi(t), and the updated states {Sˆik(t+ 1) : k ∈ K
t
i}. That is,
Zi(t+ 1) = χ
t
i(Zi(t), {Sˆik(t+ 1) :k∈ K
t
i}) = φ
t+1
i ({Sˆik(t+ 1):k ∈ K
t
i}, {Sˆik(t) :k /∈ K
t
i}). (1)
Finally, for each k = 1, . . . ,K, after receiving the computed outputs {Yˆik(t)}i:k∈Kt
i
from different
nodes, client mtk decides on the output Yˆk(t).
We consider an untrusted network where a subset of the nodes are subject to authenticated
Byzantine faults. That is, a faulty node can exhibit arbitrary behaviors that deviate from the
above described protocol, but all messages between nodes are cryptographically signed, and hence
impersonating others’ messages is easily detectable.
We say that a computation scheme P , specified by the nodes’ storage design, and the node
operations in the consensus and execution phases, is b-secure if for any subset F ⊂ {1, . . . , N} with
|F| ≤ b such that the nodes in H = {1, . . . , N} \ F are honest, and the nodes in F are subject to
authenticated Byzantine faults, the scheme achieves:
Validity: the command Xk(t) selected in the consensus phase is indeed submitted by some client
to SM k before the start of round t, for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
Consistency: for each round index t, no two honest nodes in C decide on different values for
(X1(t), . . . ,XK(t)).
Correctness: for each i ∈ C, Sˆik(t+1) = Sk(t+1), for all k ∈ Ki; and the client output Yˆk(t) = Yk(t),
for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
Liveness: all clients’ commands are executed.
2.2 Performance Metrics
A computation scheme P is characterized by its security and efficiency.
Security (βP ) is the maximum value of b such that the computation scheme P is b-secure.
Storage efficiency (γP ) is the ratio between the required memory size to store all K states and the
size of the data stored at each node, i.e., γP ,
K log |S|
log |W| . Given a fixed storage size at each node, γP
indicates the maximum number of state machines the scheme P can securely support.
Throughput (λP ) is the average number of input commands that can be securely processed per unit
operation at each node. That is, λP , lim inft→∞
K∑
N
i=1
(c(ρt
i
)+c(ψt
i
)+c(χt
i
))/N
, where c(h) denotes the
computational complexity of the function h measured in number of additions and multiplications
in F. Here we focus on the regime where the computation latency is dominated by operations in
the execution phase. Since the consensus phase of later rounds can be performed in parallel with
the execution phase of current round, we do not consider the computational complexity of the
consensus phase in the throughput definition. Also, we consider the case where all operations are
carried out in memory, and no disk I/O is needed.
3 State Machine Replication and Information-Theoretic Limits
In this section, we analyze state machine replication (SMR) and the information-theoretic limits.
Full vs. Partial Replication. A classic SMR is full replication, where the state of every state
machine is replicated across all N nodes. For each round t, the N nodes altogether run some
consensus algorithm to reach an agreement on the value of a vector of inputs (X1(t), . . . ,XK(t)). It
is clear that the validity requirement is satisfied since each node knows all the commands submitted
to all K state machines.
Synchronous network. We use the Byzantine generals protocol [28] in the consensus phase, where a
unique set of commands are proposed by a leader node and disseminated across the network. With
the protection of digital signatures, the consistency requirement can be satisfied for an arbitrary
number b < N of malicious nodes. In the execution phase, each honest node executes the agreed
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commands, and sends the outputs to intended clients. For a state transition function f with
constant complexity, the full replication scheme achieves a constant throughput of λfull = O(1).
Each client waits for b+ 1 matching responses from the nodes before it accepts the output result.
Hence, the total number of nodes N needs to be at least 2b + 1. This promises a security of
βfull = ⌊
N−1
2 ⌋ = Θ(N).
Partially synchronous network. We employ the PBFT protocol [10, 11] in the consensus phase,
which requires as least N = 3b+ 1 nodes. The execution phase is the same as in the synchronous
setting. In partially synchronous networks, the security drops to βfull = ⌊
N−1
3 ⌋ = Θ(N).
Alternatively, we can partially replicate each state machine in a disjoint subset of q = N/K
nodes. This yields a storage efficiency of γpartial = K, and a throughput of λpartial = Θ(K). Partial
replication has the same security as full replication on q nodes. That is, βpartial = ⌊
q−1
2 ⌋ = Θ(N/K)
in a synchronous network, and βpartial = ⌊
q−1
3 ⌋ = Θ(N/K) in a partially synchronous network.
Information-Theoretic Upper Bounds. Since the aggregated storage size of the entire network
has to be at least the size of all K state machines, the storage efficiency γ ≤ N . To process K input
commands, the state transition function has to be executed at leastK times across the network, and
thus the throughput λ ≤ Θ(N). Finally, the maximum number of malicious nodes any computation
scheme can tolerate cannot exceed half of the network size N . Thus, the security β ≤ N2 . By letting
K scale linearly with N , the upper bounds on all the three metrics scale linearly with N . However,
both full replication scheme and partial replication scheme make tradeoffs between their scaling.
Next, we present our main results that this tradeoff is not fundamental, and we can simultaneously
achieve optimal scaling for security, storage, and throughput.
4 Main Results
We focus on a general class of state transition functions that are multivariate polynomials of
maximum degree d. For instance, updating the balance of a bank account is a linear function of the
current balance and the incoming deposit/withdrawal. Moreover, when we represent the variables
in a state machine as bit streams, we can model any function as a polynomial using the following
result [52]: any Boolean function {0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be represented by a polynomial of degree
≤ n with at most 2n−1 terms. See Appendix A for an explicit construction of this polynomial.
Theorem 1 (synchronous setting). Consider a system of N compute nodes connected by syn-
chronous networks, up to µ (for some constant 0 ≤ µ < 12) fraction of which are subject to authen-
ticated Byzantine faults. Over this system, there exist computation schemes that support operating
up to
⌊
(1−2µ)
d N + 1−
1
d
⌋
= Θ(N) state machines with state transition function f of degree d, and
simultaneously achieve
Storage efficiency γ=
⌊
(1− 2µ)
d
N + 1−
1
d
⌋
=Θ(N), (2)
Security β=µN=Θ(N). (3)
Additionally, for broadcast networks (i.e., malicious nodes cannot send different messages to dif-
ferent nodes), we can also simultaneously achieve
Throughput λ = Θ
(
N
log2N log logN
)
. (4)
Theorem 2 (partially synchronous setting). Consider a system of N compute nodes connected
by partially synchronous networks, up to ν (for some constant 0 ≤ ν < 13) fraction of which are
subject to authenticated Byzantine faults. Over this system, there exist computation schemes that
support operating up to
⌊
(1−3ν)
d N + 1−
1
d
⌋
= Θ(N) state machines with state transition function
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f of degree d, and simultaneously achieve
Storage efficiency γ=
⌊
(1− 3ν)
d
N + 1−
1
d
⌋
=Θ(N), (5)
Security β=νN=Θ(N). (6)
We prove the storage and security scaling results in Theorem 1, and Theorem 2 in Section 5. In
particular, we present a coded computation scheme named “Coded State Machine” (CSM), which si-
multaneously achieves storage and security scaling with the network size. In Section 6, we complete
the proof of Theorem 1 by developing an information-theoretically verifiable matrix-vector multi-
plication algorithm (abbreviated as INTERMIX), which significantly slashes the computational
complexity of CSM, and helps to achieve throughput scaling.
Remark 1. The proposed CSM simultaneously achieves the information-theoretically optimal stor-
age efficiency and security to within constant multiplicative gaps, for both synchronous and par-
tially synchronous settings. It also achieves optimal throughput to within a logarithmic factor for
synchronous networks.
Remark 2. In sharp contrast to SMR, each CSM node stores a coded state that is a unique linear
combination of theK states, whose size is the same as a single state variable. In the execution phase,
each node generates a coded input command by linearly combining the K incoming commands,
and then computes the state transition function directly on the coded state and command. Using
these coded computation results from all nodes, a subset of which may be erroneous, each node
recovers the output results and the updated states via error-correcting decoding.
Remark 3. For the special case of linear state transition function (i.e., d = 1), codes designed for
distributed storage (see, e.g., [12,40]) can also be used to achieve similar scaling as CSM. However,
CSM is designed for a much more general class of arbitrary multivariate polynomials, which cannot
be handled by state-of-the-art storage codes.
5 Description of Coded State Machine
CSM simultaneously achieves optimal scaling of security, storage efficiency, and throughput. It has
two key components, including Coded State and Coded Execution. We first briefly discuss these two
components, and then describe CSM in detail.
Figure 3: Illustration of the key components of Coded State Machine. (a) Coded State: each node i
stores a coded state S˜i generated by evaluating a polynomial u(z) at point αi, where u(ωk) = Sk, for
all k = 1, . . . ,K. (b) Coded Execution: for a polynomial state transition function f , each honest node i
computes an intermediate result gi = f(S˜i, X˜i), which can be viewed as evaluating a polynomial h(z) with
higher degree at point αi. Given N computation results, a subset of which may be erroneous (g2 in this
case), Reed-Solomon decoding is used to recover h, which is then evaluated at ω1, . . . , ωK to obtain the final
output results.
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Coded State. CSM views a (possibly coded) state variable as evaluating a polynomial u(z) at a
point. As illustrated in Figure 3(a), having specified u(z) using the uncoded states S1, . . . , SK via
Lagrange interpolation at distinct points ω1, . . . , ωK , CSM generates N coded states S˜1, . . . , S˜N ,
by evaluating u(z) at distinct points α1, . . . , αN , and stores S˜i at node i. This coding design was
recently proposed in [48] for distributed computation of a polynomial over disjoint data.
Coded Execution. In the execution phase, each node i generates a coded command X˜i from the
agreed commands X1, . . . ,XK as done for the state encoding, and directly feeds S˜i and X˜i into the
state transition function f . For any multivariate polynomial f , f(S˜i, X˜i) can be viewed as evaluating
a composite polynomial h of higher degree at the point αi (see Figure 3(b)). From the intermediate
computation results h(α1), . . . , h(αN ), a subset of which may be erroneous, CSM exploits efficient
noisy interpolation techniques like Reed-Solomon decoding to recover h, and evaluates it at ωk to
obtain the output f(Sk,Xk) = h(ωk), for all k = 1, . . . ,K.
5.1 Coded State
To generate the coded states stored at the N nodes, we first pick K arbitrarily distinct elements
ω1, . . . , ωK from the field F, one for each state machine; and then pick N arbitrarily distinct elements
α1, . . . , αK from F, one for each node.
Given the K states S1(t), . . . , SK(t) at round t, we construct the Lagrange interpolation poly-
nomial ut(z) =
∑K
k=1 Sk(t)
∏
ℓ 6=k
z−ωℓ
ωk−ωℓ
. Here evaluating ut(z) at ωk recovers the state Sk(t).
Then, the coded state S˜i(t) stored at node i is generated as evaluating ut(z) at the point αi,
i.e., for all i = 1, . . . , N ,
S˜i(t) =
K∑
k=1
Sk(t)
∏
ℓ 6=k
αi − ωℓ
ωk − ωℓ
=
K∑
k=1
cikSk(t), (7)
where cik is the coefficient for the state Sk(t) at node i.
When F is finite, the field size |F| needs to be at least N for this state encoding to be feasible.
For small field (e.g., binary field), we can overcome this difficulty by using field extension and
applying CSM on the extended field (see details in Appendix A).
Since each coded state has the same size as an uncoded state, the CSM scheme has a storage
efficiency of γCSM = K.
Remark 4. The coefficients ciks in (7) used to generate coded states are independent of both
the state transition function f , and the round index t Therefore, the state encoding of CSM is
universally applicable for all types of state transition functions at each round of operations.
5.2 Coded Execution Phase
The consensus phase is performed the same as SMR in Section 3, after which all honest nodes
have agreed on the input commands X1(t), . . . ,XK(t). As the first step in the execution phase,
each node i uses the same set of coefficients ci1, . . . , ciK in (7) to compute a coded command
X˜i(t) =
∑K
k=1 cikXk(t), which is the evaluation of a polynomial vt(z) =
∑K
k=1Xk(t)
∏
ℓ 6=k
z−ωℓ
ωk−ωℓ
at
the point αi. Then, node i applies the state transition function f directly on X˜i(t) and its locally
stored S˜i(t) to obtain g
t
i = f(S˜i(t), X˜i(t)), and broadcasts g
t
i to all other nodes. Given that up to
b nodes are malicious, up to b of the N computation results are erroneous.
Synchronous network. Each node waits for a fixed interval to receive all the computation results
gt1, . . . , g
t
N . For a function f that is a multivariate polynomial of constant degree d, the result g
t
i can
be viewed as the evaluation of a univariate polynomial f(ut(z), vt(z)) of degree d(K − 1) at z = αi.
Given N such evaluation results from distinct αis, and b of them might be arbitrarily erroneous,
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Table 2: Upper bounds on the number of malicious nodes (b) to achieve consensus on input commands,
successful decoding, and secure delivery of output results.
Input Consensus Decoding Output Delivery
Synchronous b+ 1 ≤ N 2b+ 1 ≤ N − d(K − 1) 2b+ 1 ≤ N
Partially Synchronous 3b+ 1 ≤ N 3b+ 1 ≤ N − d(K − 1) 2b+ 1 ≤ N
each node can recover the coefficients of the polynomial f(ut(z), vt(z)) following the procedure of
decoding a Reed-Solomon code with dimension d(K − 1) + 1 and length N (see, e.g., [41]). This
decoding can be successful if and only if the # of errors is bounded as 2b ≤ N − d(K − 1) − 1.
After decoding, each node i locally reconstructs a polynomial fˆi(ut(z), vt(z)), and evaluates it at ωk
to obtain fˆi(ut(ωk), vt(ωk)) = fˆi(Sk(t),Xk(t)) = (Sˆik(t+ 1), Yˆik(t)), for all k = 1, . . . ,K. We note
that the reconstructed polynomials at all honest nodes are identical even when the malicious nodes
deliberately send different computation results to different nodes (i.e., in presence of equivocation).
Finally, each node i sends the recovered output Yˆik(t) to the intended client m
t
k, and updates
its local storage to S˜i(t+ 1) =
∑K
k=1 cikSˆik(t+ 1). In Table 2, we summarize the upper bounds on
b for the system to achieve consensus on input commands, successful decoding, and secure delivery
of output results for synchronous networks, among which the one for successful decoding is most
effective. Assuming a µ fraction of the N nodes are malicious, i.e., b = µN , then this computing
system can securely support up to K ≤ (1−2µ)N−1d + 1 state machines.
Partially synchronous network. In this case, since each of the b malicious nodes may refrain from
sending any messages, the remaining honest nodes should start decoding upon receiving N − b
computation results to ensure liveness. However, since a receiver node cannot distinguish between
a missing message held by a faulty node and a delayed message sent by an honest node, a node
can proceed to the decoding step with up to b of the received results being erroneous. In this case,
each node needs to decode a Reed-Solomon code with dimension d(K − 1) + 1 and length N − b,
and successful decoding requires 2b ≤ N − b− d(K − 1)− 1. Assuming a ν fraction of the N nodes
are malicious, i.e., b = νN , then this system can securely support up to K ≤ (1−3ν)N−1d + 1 state
machines. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
6 Throughput Scaling via Verifiable Computing
As defined in Section 2, the throughput of CSM is inversely proportional to
∑N
i=1 c(ρ
t
i) + c(ψ
t
i) +
c(χti) where c(ρ), c(ψ), and c(χ) respectively represent the computational complexities of encoding
and processing the input commands, decoding the state transition functions, and updating the
coded states. In this section we describe a protocol that allows for throughput scaling by reducing
this overall complexity to quasilinear in N . Our protocol comprises of two main components.
First, we describe INTERMIX, an efficient tool for information-theoretically verifiable matrix-
vector multiplication, which is at the core of all our encoding and decoding operations. INTERMIX
consists of a single worker that performs the computation, and a small randomly elected committee
of auditors that are in charge of examining the worker’s output. Once an honest auditor detects a
fraud, he interactively enforces the worker to produce an inconsistent result that can be checked in
constant time by every node in the network. Next, we show that by delegating the entire encoding
and decoding operations to a single node in the network, the overall complexity can be reduced
to quasilinear in N . Computing state transition on the coded state and commands will be done
distributedly at each node, similar as before. We will show that the correctness of all the operations
performed by this single worker can be checked by every node in the network, by using INTERMIX
as a blackbox verification module. A block-diagram of the proposed model has been illustrated in
Figure 4. We note that the correctness of the results in this section relies on additional assumptions
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Figure 4: A block-diagram of the proposed centralized computation model for throughput scaling. INTER-
MIX is used for verifying the correctness of the results.
Figure 5: Illustration of INTERMIX for verifiable matrix vector multiplication. An honest auditor can
interactively enforce the worker to provide an inconsistent result that can be checked in constant time. We
assume that the remaining nodes (the commoners) can overhear the entire conversation.
of synchronous and broadcast (no equivocation) network.
6.1 INTERMIX, Efficiently Verifiable Matrix-Vector Multiplication
Suppose we have a network of N nodes, a matrix A ∈ FN×K and a vector X ∈ FK×1. Node i is
interested in computing AiX where Ai represents the i’th row of A. Our objective is to delegate the
entire computation to only one node (the worker), while the remaining nodes verify the correctness
of the results. Our approach is to randomly choose J nodes to audit the worker, where J is a
constant large enough that the probability that none of the auditors is honest is negligible. Each
auditor will repeat the computation of Y = AX and compares it with the result returned by the
worker. An (honest) auditor who detects a fraud in the computation, will interactively enforce the
worker to produce an inconsistent result which can be checked in constant time by the remaining
nodes in the network. The algorithm has the following components.
• Random Committee/Leader Election: A worker and a committee of auditors are chosen
randomly. Given that at most a µ fraction of the nodes in the network are dishonest, we choose
J = log ǫ/ log µ auditors at random, in order to ensure with probability 1 − ǫ, that at least one
auditor is honest. An easy way to do this is to allow each node to self-elect with probability
J
N . If an adversary decides to conduct a DoS attack by imposing unnecessary audits, he will be
banned from the next rounds of the algorithm.
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In a dynamic setting, where banning is ineffective, the local coin-toss algorithm can be replaced
by any off-the-shelf distributed random number generating algorithm (such as [39, 45]). Given
that we do not need fresh randomness at every round of computation, we only run such an
algorithm occasionally to amortize its overhead. The committee can still be updated at every
round by relying on a standard pseudorandom number generator.
We can further hinder a dynamic adversary who wishes to corrupt the auditors after the election
process, by keeping the identities of the auditors secret with the help of Verifiable Random
Functions (VRF) [14,35]. Accordingly, an auditor remains anonymous until he decides to conduct
an audit, at which point he presents a proof of having been elected.
Remark 5. It is important to note that the auditors are stateless, which makes it possible to
change the committee at every round of computation, without imposing significant communi-
cation overhead on the network. To make a comparison, random sortition algorithms [25, 36]
are more prone to dynamic adversaries, due to the prohibitively large communication overhead
associated with frequently updating the allocation of the nodes to the state machines.
• Computation (Auditors and the Worker): If the worker is honest, he computes Yˆ = AX
and broadcasts this result to the network. If he is dishonest, he broadcasts an arbitrary Yˆ . Each
auditor repeats the computation of AX.
• Interactive Localization of the Fraud (Auditors and the Worker): If an (honest) auditor
does not detect a fraud in the computation, he will inform the rest of the network (henceforth
referred to as the commoners) that the result is correct. Otherwise, he will aim at proving to
the commoners that the result returned by the worker is wrong. He will accomplish this task
through a set of logK interactive queries to the worker as follows.
Note that if Yˆ 6= Y , there must exist at least one index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that Yi 6= Yˆi. If
there are multiple such indices, the auditor will choose one such i arbitrarily, and will aim at
proving to the commoners that Yˆi 6= AiX, which will be sufficient to prove that Yˆ 6= Y . To fulfill
this goal, first the auditor breaks Ai into two consecutive chunks of equal size named B1 and
B2. Similarly, the vector X is broken into X1 and X2. The auditor asks the worker to compute
Z1 = B1X1 as well as Z2 = B2X2. If Zˆ1 + Zˆ2 6= Yˆi, the auditor raises an alert to draw the
attention of the commoners to this fact. A commoner can simply check that Zˆ1 + Zˆ2 6= Yˆi and
is convinced of the fraud. On the other hand, if Zˆ1 + Zˆ2 = Yˆi, we must have either Zˆ1 6= B1X1
or Zˆ2 6= B2X2. The auditor proceeds to compute both Z1 and Z2 in order to locate the fraud.
Once this is done, the auditor can focus on the corresponding half of the vector and repeat the
algorithm, until an inconsistency is detected. This algorithm is summarized below.
• Verification (Commoners): If all the auditors acknowledge the correctness of the result,
the commoners will accept the result provided by the worker. If an auditor returns False in
Algorithm 1 within the loop (while s > 1), the commoners will check in constant time whether
Yˆ (j,1)+ Yˆ (j,2) = Yˆ (j). If this equality does not hold, the commoners will conclude that the result
is incorrect. Finally, if the algorithm returns False in the last stage, the commoners will check in
constant time whether Yˆ (j) = A(j)X(j) holds or not.
Correctness. If the worker is honest, an honest auditor will observe that Yˆ = Y and acknowledge
its correctness. If all the auditors return True, the commoners will accept the result as correct.
The action space of a dishonest auditor is quite limited. Firstly, he can impose unnecessary audits
on the honest worker despite observing that Yˆ = Y . Furthermore, he can return False despite
detecting no inconsistency in the responses to the audits. By doing so, he can merely worsen the
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm run by an honest auditor
Input: A,X, Yˆ .
Output: One bit indicating whether the auditing process has succeeded or failed. A string ζ
that localizes the failure.
1: if Yˆ = AX then
2: Return True.
3: end if
4: Choose i such that Yˆi 6= AiX. Set ζ = [i].
5: Set j = 1, A(1) = Ai, X
(1) = X, Yˆ (1) = Yˆi, s = length(A
(1)).
6: while (s > 1) do
7: Let A(j,1) = A
(j)
1:⌊s/2⌋, A
(j,2) = A
(j)
⌊s/2⌋+1:s, X
(j,1) = X
(j)
1:⌊s/2⌋, X
(j,2) = X
(j)
⌊s/2⌋+1:s.
8: Request Y (j,1) = A(j,1)X(j,1) and Y (j,2) = A(j,2)X(j,2) from the worker. Receive
Yˆ (j,1), Yˆ (j,2).
9: if Yˆ (j,1) + Yˆ (j,2) 6= Yˆ (j) then
10: Return (False, ζ).
11: else
12: Choose ℓ ∈ {1, 2} such that Yˆ (j,ℓ) 6= Y (j,ℓ). Let s = length(Y (j,ℓ)) and ζ = [ζ, ℓ].
13: Let Yˆ (j+1) = Yˆ (j,ℓ), A(j+1) = A(j,ℓ) and X(j+1) = X(j,ℓ).
14: Increment j.
15: end if
16: end while
17: Return (False, ζ).
complexity of the system. A commoner can verify that there is no inconsistency in the outputs of
the worker in constant time and dismiss the malicious auditor’s alert.
(Information-theoretic) Soundness. Suppose the worker is dishonest, i.e., Yˆ 6= Y . Remember
that we chose J large enough that the probability of having no honest auditor is ǫ. Therefore,
with probability 1 − ǫ there will be an honest auditor which will be able to localize the fraud of
the worker following the interactive method described in Algorithm 1. Furthermore, relying on
the assumptions of broadcast and synchronous network, if a worker chooses to not respond to
any auditor, the commoners can detect this violation of the protocol, and decide that the worker
is malicious. Note that the soundness of INTERMIX does not rely on any assumption on the
computation power of the worker. In other words, INTERMIX is information-theoretically secure,
since even a computationally unbounded worker is unable to compromise the soundness of the
algorithm.
Overall Computational Complexity of the Verification Scheme. Let us compute the overall
complexity under a worst case assumption that all the auditors conduct queries to the worker. One
auditor can increase the complexity of the worker and himself by 2rK/2+2rK/4+2rK/8+ · · · where
rj represents the complexity of computing the inner-product of two vectors of length j, and is equal
to 2j. As a result, in a worst case scenario, where all the auditors conduct queries, the overall
added complexity due to inner-product computation is 8JK. Each auditor also performs 3 log(K)
comparisons between his locally computed results and the results returned by the worker.
A auditor can also increase the complexity of the commoners by returning False in Algorithm
1. In this case, a commoner will conduct one comparison operation to check if the auditor’s alert
is valid or not. In a worst case scenario, where all the auditors return False, the overall complexity
of the commoners increases by N − J − 1.
Therefore, the worst-case computational complexity of INTERMIX is (J + 1)c(AX) + 8JK +
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3J logK +N − J − 1, where c(AX) denotes the computational complexity of multiplying A by X.
We observe that as N grows large, and unless the matrix A has a very simple structure, the overall
complexity of INTERMIX is dominated by the complexity of centralized computation of AX.
6.2 Centralization of Encoding/Decoding for Throughput Scaling
To reduce the coding complexity using the idea of verifiable computing, we must address a funda-
mental question: if all encoding/decoding operations are performed at a single node, can we achieve
a per node complexity that scales sub-linearly with N? To answer this question, let us look at all the
coding operations in CSM, i.e., (i) encoding of input commands, (ii) decoding of output results/next
states, and (iii) updating coded states. We present computation schemes at a single node that has
sub-linear complexity in N for each of the above coding operations. We will use INTERMIX as a
verification module throughout this section, wherever the need for trusted computation arises.
Encoding of input commands. As we saw in Section 5.2, for the encoding of the input
commands, we pick K distinct elements ω1, . . . , ωK ∈ F, and N distinct elements α1, . . . , αN ∈
F. At each round t, we perform a Lagrange polynomial interpolation using the points
(ω1,X1(t)), . . . , (ωK ,XK(t)) to construct a polynomial vt(z). For each node i, the coded com-
mand X˜i(t) is generated as X˜i(t) = vt(αi). We consider computing coded commands of all N
nodes at a single node which we call the worker. The encoding process proceeds in two steps: 1)
polynomial interpolation, 2) multi-point polynomial evaluation.
Step 1: Polynomial interpolation. Given the input commands X1(t), . . . ,XK(t), the worker
performs Lagrange interpolation to find a polynomial vt(z) of degree K − 1 that passes through
all Xi(t), i.e., vt(z) =
∑K
k=1Xk(t)
∏
ℓ 6=k
z−ωℓ
ωk−ωℓ
=
∑K−1
j=0 aj(t)z
j , where aj(t) is the coefficient for
the term zj . This operation can be done with computational complexity (operation counts) of
O(K log2K log logK) (see, e.g., [24]).
Step 2: Multi-point polynomial evaluation. Having obtained the coefficients a0, . . . , aK−1,
the worker evaluates vt(z) at the points α1, . . . , αN to compute the coded inputs X˜1(t), . . . , X˜N (t).
Specifically,


X˜1(t)
...
X˜N (t)

 =


1 α1 · · · α
K−1
1
...
...
. . .
...
1 αN · · · α
K−1
N




a0(t)
...
aK−1(t)

 =


c11 · · · c1K
...
. . .
...
cN1 · · · cNK




X1(t)
...
XK(t)

, where
cik =
∏
ℓ 6=k
αi−ωℓ
ωk−ωℓ
is the coefficient of Xk(t). This operation can be done using fast polynomial
arithmetic with computational complexity O(N log2N log logN) (see, e.g., [24, 34]). Hence, the
total computational complexity to encode the input commands is O(N log2N log logN). Define
C = [cik]N×K . The committee of auditors will use the second equality, i.e., fact that X˜(t) = CX(t)
to interactively verify the correctness of the results with the INTERMIX algorithm.
Updating coded states. At the end of round t, each node i updates its local coded state to
S˜i(t+1). Centralized state update can be done similarly to encoding the input commands. Here, the
worker interpolates the polynomial ut+1(z), as defined in Section 5.1, and evaluates it at α1, . . . , αN .
The auditors take advantage of the fact that


S˜1(t+ 1)
...
S˜N (t+ 1)

 =


c11 · · · c1K
...
. . .
...
cN1 · · · cNK




S1(t+ 1)
...
SK(t+ 1)

 to help
the commoners verify the correctness of the results in constant time, via INTERMIX.
Decoding of the output results/new states. Consider a state transition function f of degree
d. The coded computation result at an honest node i can be viewed as evaluating a polynomial ht
of degree K ′ = (K − 1)d at the point αi. That is, f(X˜i(t), S˜i(t)) = ht(αi) =
∑K ′
j=0 bj(t)α
j
i , where
bj(t) is the coefficient of the term z
j in ht. After receiving the computation results {g
t
i}
N
i=1 from
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all N nodes, up to µ fraction of which are erroneous, a worker node decodes b0(t), . . . , bK ′(t) with
a computational complexity of O(N log2N log logN) (say, using Berlekamp-Welch algorithm).
Having decoded b0(t), . . . , bK ′(t), the worker node is required to broadcast these coefficients to
the rest of the network, and then evaluates g at the points ω1, . . . , ωK to recover the output results
and the next set of states. That is, the worker node computes

(Y1(t), S1(t+ 1))
...
(YK(t), SK(t+ 1))

 =


1 ω1 · · · ω
K ′
1
...
...
. . .
...
1 ωK · · · ω
K ′
K




b0(t)
...
bK ′(t)

 . (8)
The computational complexity of this step is O(N log2N log logN).
Two steps are required to verify the correctness of the decoded results. Firstly, the worker needs
to prove that his decoding of the coefficients b0(t), . . . , bK ′(t) are correct. Secondly, he needs to
prove that (8) is computed correctly. This second step can be directly accomplished via INTERMIX
applied on the matrix Ω = [ωji ]K×(K ′+1) and the vector [b0(t) . . . bK ′(t)]
⊤. We will now describe
how INTERMIX can be used for verifiable polynomial interpolation in the presence of errors.
We know from principles of error correction coding, that the polynomial ht(z) =
∑K ′
j=0 bj(t)z
j
is the correct interpolation among the N received points {(αi, g
t
i)}
N
i=1, if and only if there exists a
set τ of size at least N − N−K
′−1
2 =
N+K ′+1
2 such that ht(αi) = g
t
i for all i ∈ τ . We will require
the worker to broadcast this set τ together with the decoded coefficients b0(t), . . . , bK ′(t). Let us
without loss of generality assume that τ = {1, . . . , N+K
′+1
2 }. It must hold that

gt1
...
gt
N+K′+1
2

 =


1 α1 . . . α
K ′
1
...
...
. . .
...
1 αN+K′+1
2
. . . αK
′
N+K′+1
2




b0(t)
...
bK ′(t)

 . (9)
Now, we can apply INTERMIX to verify the correctness of (9), and subsequently verify the cor-
rectness of the decoding operation.
6.3 Evaluating the Throughput
We are now ready to characterize the throughput of CSM using INTERMIX, and establish the final
claim of Theorem 1. We saw in this section that the complexities of the encoding and decoding op-
erations are reduced to O(N log2N log logN) given that the entire computation is delegated to only
one node. Furthermore, each intermediate result can be computed locally in constant time given
that the polynomial f(X˜i(t), S˜i(t)) has a fixed degree that does not grow with N . Therefore, the
overall computational complexity of the CSM is
∑N
i=1 c(ρ
t
i)+c(ψ
t
i)+c(χ
t
i) = O(N log
2N log logN)+
O(N), where the first term indicates the complexity of the auditors and the worker, and the sec-
ond term indicates the aggregate complexity of the remaining nodes. The throughput of CSM is
computed as λCSM = lim inft→∞
K∑
N
i=1
(c(ρt
i
)+c(ψt
i
)+c(χt
i
))/N
= Θ
(
N
log2N log logN
)
. This completes the
proof of the last statement about throughput scaling in Theorem 1.
7 Discussions
In this section, we discuss engineering considerations and future research directions raised by CSM.
Blockchain Applications. One motivation for working on CSM is that (sharded) blockchain
systems are best represented using the state machine formalism. While the current instantiations of
blockchains are based on full replication, future proposals are most similar to partial replication [33],
both of which make severe security-efficiency tradeoffs [44]. The results of this paper on coded state
machines can be used as a stepping stone towards scalable and secure blockchain designs.
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Random Allocation vs. CSM. An alternate architecture for scaling security and efficiency
simultaneously is to randomly allocate nodes into groups that process distinct state machines.
In this method, the fraction of adversaries in the group will be representative of the fraction of
adversaries in the entire network. However, a dynamic adversary who observes this grouping can do
post-facto corruptions to the small number of nodes in that group, thus making security proportional
to group size. One possible solution is to rotate the group allocations periodically [25], but this
cannot be very frequent since this will require each node to re-download the data corresponding
to different state machines. In CSM we avoid this tradeoff completely, and the full security is
guaranteed against a dynamic adversary as well.
Verifiable Computing vs. INTERMIX. In order to scale throughput, there have been sev-
eral existing proposals to do verifiable computing [5–7, 21, 38], where one node does computation
and other nodes verify the computation in sub-linear time. These methods are only secure un-
der cryptographic assumptions, are not yet practically scalable and potentially require a trusted
setup. By contrast, INTERMIX is information-theoretically secure, is practical and does not re-
quire a trusted setup. However, compared with some other verifiable computation approaches, the
interactive nature of INTERMIX becomes a disadvantage.
Degree Dependence. The proposed CSM is efficient only when the degree of the polynomial is a
constant. As a future direction of research, we aim at generalizing the results to the scenario where
the state machine can be represented as a low-depth arithmetic circuit. While low-depth circuits
can still have high polynomial degrees, their algebraic structures can be potentially exploited to
design efficient computation schemes.
Distinct State Machines. Our present approach in CSM assumes that the K distinct state
machines have the same state transition function, only distinct sequences of inputs. A future
direction of research will be to generalize CSM to the case of distinct state transition functions.
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A Field Extension for General Boolean Functions
Using the construction of [52, Theorem 2], we can represent any arbitrary Boolean function f :
{0, 1}n → {0, 1} whose inputs are n binary variables as a multivariate polynomial p of degree n
as follows. For each vector a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ {0, 1}
n, we define ha = z1z2 · · · zn, where zi = xi if
ai = 1, and zi = yi if ai = 0. Next, we partition {0, 1}
n into two disjoint subsets S0 and S1 as
follows.
S0 = {a ∈ {0, 1}
n : f(a) = 0}, (10)
S1 = {a ∈ {0, 1}
n : f(a) = 1}. (11)
The polynomial p is then constructed as
p(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , yn)=
∑
a∈S1
ha=1+
∑
a∈S0
ha, (12)
where yi = xi + 1.
For a state machine whose state, input command, and output result are represented as bit
streams, with a state transition polynomial p over binary field (i.e., F = {0, 1}) in the form of (12),
the state encoding in (7) does not directly apply since it requires the field size |F| to be at least the
network size N . To use CSM in this case, we can embed each element sk[i] ∈ {0, 1} of a state Sk
(time index omitted) into a binary extension field F2m with 2
m ≥ N . Specifically, the embedding
s¯k[i] ∈ F2m of the element sk[i] is generated such that
s¯k[i] =


00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
, sk[i] = 0,
00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
1, sk[i] = 1.
(13)
Then we can select distinct elements α1, . . . , αN ∈ F2m to apply the encoding on the states in the
extension field. We also use the same embedding and coding on the input commands.
State transition over extension field generates the correct result. To see that, we can easily
verify that the value of the state transition polynomial p as constructed in (12) is invariant with
the embedding operation in (13). That is, since the polynomial p is the summation of monomials
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in F2, when we replace each input bit with its embedding, the output value is 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
in F2m if
p = 0, and the output value is 00 · · · 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
m−1
1 in F2m if p = 1.
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